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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effect of interest rates on investment in an environment where firms make
irreversible investments and learn over time. In this setting, changes in the interest rate affect both
the cost of capital and the cost of delaying investment. These two forces combine to generate an
aggregate investment demand curve that is always a backward-bending function of the interest rate.
At low rates, increasing the interest rate stimulates investment by raising the cost of delay. Existing
evidence supports the hypothesis that firms change the time at which they invest in response to









  Macroeconomic policies to stimulate investment are frequently motivated by the
downward sloping relationship between investment demand and interest rates derived from
neoclassical models of investment.  The intuition underlying this relationship is straightforward:
Lowering the cost of capital via monetary or tax policies stimulates investment by enlarging the
set of projects that are sufficiently profitable to warrant investment.1
  This paper shows that this canonical result breaks down when firms making irreversible
investment decisions can learn over time, as in standard real options or "time to build" models.2
To see the intuition, consider a pharmaceutical company deciding how quickly to proceed with
investments in operations to produce new drugs.  The firm is uncertain about which drugs will be
successful, and can acquire further information by delaying investment via R&D.  The cost of
delaying investment is that the firm cannot retire its outstanding debt as quickly, raising its
interest expenses.   Now consider how an increase in the interest rate will affect the firm's 3
behavior.  A higher interest rate reduces the set of drugs that surpass the hurdle rate for
investment, creating the standard cost of capital effect that acts to reduce the scale of investment.
But a higher interest rate also makes the firm more eager to retire its debt quickly by investing
immediately so that it has a chance to earn profits sooner.  This second "timing effect" acts to
raise current investment.  These two forces combine to generate a non-monotonic investment
demand curve.
  To formalize this intuition, I first analyze a simple dynamic model where a continuum of
profit-maximizing firms make binary investment decisions and can observe a noisy signal about
the parameters that control payoffs by postponing investment.  In this model, expected profits
grow at a rate   when firms delay investment because they acquire more information and 1!
increase the probability of investing only in successful ventures.  Profits earned in subsequent
1Haavelmo (1960) pioneered the neoclassical theory of investment and Jorgenson (1963) derived equations to
estimate the effect of the user cost of capital on investment.
2Models of the timing of investment were first analyzed by Marglin (1967, 1970) in the context of government
investment.  Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide extensive reviews of the real options literature.
3This example ignores the additional cost of delay due to loss of rents in a competitive industry.  This important
issue is addressed below.2
periods are discounted at the interest rate,  .  Therefore, firms invest immediately only if the <
expected profit from investment is positive   the expected growth in profits from delaying ( ) and 1
is less than the interest rate.  The backward-bending shape of the aggregate investment demand
curve , arises directly from this firm-level optimality condition.  If   is low,   is likely to ßM Ð < Ñ < 1
exceed  , compelling many firms to delay investment rather than investing in period 1.  On the <
other hand, when   is high, the expected return to immediate investment is negative for many <
firms, making investment in period 1 suboptimal for them.  Consequently, aggregate investment
is maximized at an intermediate  , and   is upward-sloping from   to  and downward- < ! M Ð < Ñ ! < ‡‡
sloping above  . <‡ 4
  The backward-bending property of the investment demand curve is robust to several
generalizations of the basic model.  First, permitting choices about the scale of investment does
not affect the result.  The aggregate economy in the basic extensive-marginal model is
isomorphic to a single firm making scale choices, so the main intuition still goes through.
Second, I study the effects of competition in a model where prices and profit rates are
determined endogenously in equilibrium to equate supply and demand.  If firms can earn
sufficiently high quasi-rents (producer surplus) from investment in the short-run, the equilibrium
level of investment remains a backward-bending function of  .  Intuitively, as long as the <
marginal firm values the option to delay in equilibrium -- which will be true if entry by identical
competitors does not occur immediately -- the interest rate continues to affect both the cost of
delay and the cost of capital, thereby generating two opposing forces on investment demand in
equilibrium.  Third, in a model where firms have additional margins of choice beyond scale,
other behavioral responses such as changes in the composition of investment reinforce the
backward-bending shape that arises from learning effects.  For instance, if construction is
cheaper when firms take a longer time to build (as in Alchian, 1959), they have an incentive to
4In recent work independent of this study, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2004) and Capozza and Li (2001) point
out that interest rate changes can have non-monotonic effects on IPOs and real estate development decisions.  Their
models differ from the present analysis in several respects, which are discussed along with their empirical results in
section 4.3
switch to slower building technologies when interest rates are low, reducing aggregate
investment for reasons independent of learning.
  The unconventional relationship between   and   derived here is of interest for two M<
reasons.  First, the model in this paper is representative of the extensive literature on irreversible
investment under uncertainty, a concept that Caballero (1999) emphasizes is "at the center of
modern theories."  From a normative perspective, it is useful to understand how interest rates
should affect investment in what is increasingly viewed as the leading theory of investment
behavior.  Second, the non-monotonic relationship is interesting from an empirical perspective
because several econometric studies have searched for a negative relationship between
exogenous changes in the cost of capital and aggregate investment demand without success.5
This paper proposes a model that could explain the lack of a clear, monotonic relationship
between   and   at least in certain high-risk sectors of the economy. M<
  A natural question in this regard is whether the timing effects that generate the non-
monotonic investment curve are empirically important.  Existing microeconomic studies,
reviewed in section 4, find that firms change the time at which they invest in response to changes
in interest rates in several industries, ranging from mining to real estate development.  In
addition, studies show that many firms in high-risk sectors explicitly or implicitly use real-
options approaches to make investment decisions, and that the timing of investment appears to
be a real choice variable.  Hence, it is clear that at least some firms follow decision rules that
generate a non-monotonic relationship between investment and the interest rate.
  While this evidence suggests that timing effects are empirically relevant, it of course does
not directly indicate the importance of these issues for aggregate investment demand.  Sharper
5Several studies have found that interest rates have  little or no effect on the level of aggregate investment; see e.g.,
the early studies of Eisner and Nadiri (1968) and Feldstein and Flemming (1971), or Chirinko (1993a,b) for a
review.  A modern literature that exploits cross-sectional variation in the user cost finds a larger role for the cost of
capital in the long run in some sectors (see e.g., Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard 1994, who exploit tax reforms as
natural experiments).  Caballero (1999) and Hassett and Hubbard (2002) review this literature.  In interpreting these
results, note that in the model proposed here, tax changes can affect investment differently than changes in   and <
interest elasticities are more negative in the long run than the short run.  These points are discussed in greater detail
in section 5.4
tests of the relationship between interest rates are required.  The learning structure of the model
yields many predictions that could be tested in future work.  The most important is perhaps that
an increase in the interest rate is more likely to increase investment in sectors or times when the
potential to learn is greater, i.e. when signals about future payoffs are more informative and the
variance of payoffs is large.  Examples that satisfy these conditions include startups or small
businesses, especially in high-tech fields.  Intuitively, the effect of changes in   on the cost of <
learning become amplified when the potential to learn is large.  The learning effect thus
dominates the cost of capital effect for a larger range of  , raising the investment-maximizing  . << ‡
  Several other empirical implications are derived as well.  First, a permanent increase in <
is more likely to raise investment in the short-run than the long run, because the benefits to
additional learning diminish over time.  Second, a change in   affects not only the size but also <
the quality of investment non-monotonically.  Raising   when   expands the pool of current <<  < ‡
investors and drives down average observed profits by bringing in less successful ventures;
raising   when   raises the average observed profit rate.  Finally, temporary changes in <<  < ‡
interest rates create incentives to substitute investment intertemporally, in different directions
depending on whether the changes are anticipated or not.  The model predicts when the yield
curve becomes steeper, current investment should rise relative to subsequent investment.
  In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that the interest rate is taken
as exogenous throughout this paper.  The determinants of the supply of capital are therefore left
unspecified.   This partial-equilibrium approach is appropriate in analyzing policy questions 6
such as the effects of exogenous changes in the user cost of capital via tax or monetary policies.
This question has been the primary focus of the empirical literature, which has at least attempted
to generate exogenous variation in   using instrumental-variable and other econometric <
techniques (see Chirinko 1993b).  The relationship between investment and interest rates derived
6The supply of capital could itself be a non-monotone function of   for several reasons, including countervailing <
price and wealth effects and asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  In addition, if consumers
purchasing durables can learn more about their properties by delaying purchase, the same non-monotonicities that
arise from learning effects on the investment demand side could also affect the schedule of the supply of funds.5
here should not be expected to hold when   is endogenously determined in general equilibrium, <
as changes in   could occur because of autonomous shocks to investment demand (a simultaneity <
problem).
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops a stylized
model of investment by learning firms.  It solves for optimal investment behavior, and
aggregates the model to derive an investment demand curve.  The main backward-bending
investment result is derived for this model in section 2.  Section 3 generalizes the result to more
realistic environments.  Section 4 describes existing empirical evidence that supports the main
timing intuition, and section 5 derives additional empirical implications of the model.  The final
section offers concluding remarks.  All proofs are given in the appendix.
1   A Stylized Model of Investment by Learning Firms
  I analyze the effect of interest rates on investment in a standard discrete-time learning
model where firms are Bayesian updaters.  Firms are assumed to be residual claimants in all
states of the world and make one irreversible investment decision with the objective of
maximizing profits.  Two simplifying assumptions are made in the basic case: Firms only decide
whether to invest or not (the scale of investment at the firm level is not flexible), and competitive
forces are ignored by taking profit rates as exogenous.  The basic model thus best describes a
firm that has already obtained a patent on an idea (e.g. a chemical compound) and is deciding
when to market its innovation (e.g. a new drug) by building a factory. I first analyze the
investment decision of a single firm of this type, and then aggregate over firms with
heterogeneous expectations to characterize total investment in the economy.
1.1   Structure and Assumptions6
  Suppose a firm is deciding whether to invest in a new plant that can be built at cost  . G
The economy is stationary in the sense that nominal revenues from the project and the cost of
investment are constant over time.  In a world of perfect information, the manager's decision rule
is simple: invest if the rate of return from the project is the higher than that of his best
alternative.  But the manager is uncertain about how strong demand for the firm's product will
be.  To model his uncertainty, assume that there are two possible distributions that govern the
characteristics of demand   for the product in each period.  Labeling the two distributions  D0 Ð D Ñ
and  , index the true distribution by  , where 1ÐDÑ − Ö!ß"× .
.. œ!ÊDµ0Ð D Ñ œ"ÊDµ1 Ð D Ñ and
The value of   determines the stream of revenues that the firm gets from investment.  Let  . V.
denote the manager's expectation of totalrevenuefrom the project in state   and let   denote .. œ"
the good state, i.e. assume  .  To make the problem nontrivial, assume that investment is V V "!
unprofitable in the bad state  , i.e.  .  Note that the two-state assumption simplifies a<  ! V  G !
the exposition but is not essential; the results hold with a continuous state space.
  Investing in the plant allows the firm to start production in the next period, so revenue
starts accruing one period after the investment is made.  The plant generates revenue via sales of
the product for a fixed number of periods, after which it is worthless.  The decision to invest is
irreversible -- once the plant is built, it cannot be sold at any price.   This assumption, which is 7
equivalent to assuming a large non-convex adjustment cost for the capital stock, underlies most
recent investment models (Caballero, 1999).  It is motivated by evidence that investment is a
very lumpy process in practice.  For instance, Doms and Dunne (1993) document that nearly
40% of the median firm's investment over a 17 year span takes place within the span of one year
in the U.S.  More recently, Goolsbee and Gross (1997) find strong evidence of non-convex
adjustment costs in data on investment decisions of US airlines.
7Full irreversibility is not essential.  If there were a cost to investing and then liquidating the plant, the firm would
still be reluctant to plunge resources into a venture of uncertain value.  But if the investment decision were fully
reversible and all money put in could be recovered, there would be no reason not to invest immediately.7
  To model learning, assume that the manager can gain further information about the
probability distribution governing demand by delaying his investment decision and observing a
signal  .  These observations can be used to update prior beliefs about the project's payoff, D
allowing the firm to make a more informed decision.  Let   denote the manager's -. ! œTÐ œ" Ñ
prior belief that the project will succeed.  By postponing his decision to the next period, he
updates his estimate of the probability of success to   after observing a -. " œTÐ œ" l D Ñ
realization of  . D
  The cost of this reduction in uncertainty is that a delayed investment yields revenues one
period later, which have lower present value.  To simplify the analysis, I abstract from additional
costs of delay that the firm may incur, such as the cost of performing the research needed to
obtain the signal or the permanent loss of one period of profits.   Section 3.2 shows that the key
results hold as long as the additional interest-invariant cost of delaying is small relative to the
potential benefits of delay.
  Having outlined the basic features of the model, we can define the firm's action space and
profit functions formally.  Let   denote the decision to invest immediately,   the decision to 36
delay, and   the real interest rate.  Assume that the investment opportunity is available for  < X
periods; after   periods, the opportunity disappears, perhaps because the patent expires and all X
rents are bid away.   In the terminal period  , the firm therefore must decide either to invest 8 X
immediately or reject the project.  The profit function,  , identifies the expected payoff (in 1>ÐÑ .
period 1 dollars), to investing in period   when the true state is  :   > .
1> >" ÐÑ œ Ö  G × ÐÑ
"




To simplify the discussion below, I restrict attention to the case in which the manager must
decide whether to invest or not within   periods: here, delaying investment more than once   Xœ#
8Though the phrasing below refers to finite  , the results apply to   as well. XX œ _8
is not possible.  However, all the results for the basic model are proved in the appendix for
general  , including the limiting case of an infinite decision horizon. X
1.2 Optimal Investment Rule    
  The optimal action in each period can be computed by solving the firm's dynamic
programming problem using backwards induction.  To reduce notation, assume that the signal D
is a scalar, and that the likelihood ratio of the two densities,  , is monotonically and
1ÐDÑ
0ÐDÑ
continuously increasing in  .  his monotonic likelihood ratio property holds for many D T
distributions, including all one parameter Natural Exponential Families.  The motivation for
these assumptions will become clear shortly.  Let   denote the expected value of investing in ZÐ 3 Ñ
period 1 and   the expected value of delay. ZÐ 6 Ñ
Lemma 1  In period 2, the firm invests iff   where  satisfies DD D ‡‡








0 VÎ Ð "< ÑG "
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  In period 1, the firm invests iff
ZÐÑœ Ð GÑÐ " Ñ Ð GÑ Ð Ñ
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"< "<










  where  and  "! ÐD Ñ ´ 1ÐDÑ.D ÐD Ñ ´ 0ÐDÑ.DÞ ‡‡
DD
__ '' ‡‡
When making his period 2 decision, the manager needs to determine the relative likelihood that
the observed signal   came from the distributions corresponding to  .  He refines his D œ !ß" .
estimate of   using Bayes Rule, and compares the expected payoffs to investing and not TÐ œ"Ñ .9
investing in period 2 given his updated belief.  If the likelihood that the observed demand   came D
from the good distribution   is high -- that is, if   exceeds some threshold value -- he invests. 1
1ÐDÑ
0ÐDÑ
Hence, the firm's second period decision rule is formally identical to a likelihood ratio
hypothesis test.  The test here has power   and type one error rate  , where   is chosen "! ÐD Ñ ÐD Ñ D ‡‡ ‡
via profit maximization in period 2.  In the limiting case of noiseless signals,   and "ÐBÑ œ "
!ÐBÑ œ ! aB   .  The probability that the manager will invest in period 2 when   is  , while ." œ"
the probability that he will invest when   is  . .! œ!
 






































FIGURE 1. PERIOD 2 INVESTMENT DECISION AFTER OBSERVING DEMAND SIGNAL
  If   is monotonic, this likelihood ratio test translates into a cutoff value for investment
1ÐDÑ
0ÐDÑ
in the second period ( ) determined by the manager's prior odds and the profit-loss ratio.  The D‡
cutoff   is computed as in (2) so that the expected profit from investing in period 2 conditional D‡
on observing a signal of exactly   is zero.  Intuitively, at the optimal threshold, the manager D‡
should be indifferent between investing and not investing in period 2; if he were not, there would10
either be a region of the state space where he is investing and earning negative expected profits
or one where he is not investing when he could have earned positive expected profits.
  In period 1, the firm again chooses the action that maximizes its expected payoff, where
possible actions are now to invest or learn by delaying.  The payoff to investing is the expected
profit in period 1, where the weight in the expectation is given by the prior belief,  .  The -!
payoff to learning,  , is also a weighted average of profits in each state, but there are two ZÐ 6 Ñ
changes in the formula.  First, the relevant payoff outcomes are   instead of   -- revenue is 11 #"
discounted more steeply because it is earned one period later.  Second, the weights in the profit
expression are multiplied by the factors   and  .  The term corresponding to the good "! ÐD Ñ ÐD Ñ ‡‡
state,  , decreases by the weight   because of the chance of rejecting the project 1#
‡ Ð"Ñ ÐD Ñ  " "
when it is profitable.  The test's benefit is that  , placing less weight on the negative !ÐD Ñ  " ‡
term corresponding to the bad state.  The sole benefit of delaying investment is to reduce the
probability of undertaking an unprofitable venture.
  The period 1 investment rule is closely linked to the results of existing real options
models.  To see this,let   denote the expected growth in profits by delaying, which is the 1
undiscounted expected profit in period 2 divided by the expected profit in period 1 (minus 1):
1œ " Ð Ñ
Ö Ð DÑ Ð  G Ñ  Ð "  Ñ Ð DÑ Ð  G Ñ ×












" ! 4 
We can rewrite the period 1 optimality condition for investment given in (0) as
ZÐ 3 Ñ! <1 Ð Ñ  and  5
  As we will see shortly, this expression is the key condition that drives the backward-
bending result.  The intuition underlying this condition is that it is optimal to invest if (a) the
expected profit from investment is positive   (b) the growth rate of profits from delaying,  , is and 1
smaller than the interest rate,  .  If the second condition is not satisfied, the firm will delay since <
doing so yields a higher expected rate of return than the market interest rate.11
  Importantly, the intuition in (5), and therefore the subsequent results, apply much more
generally than in the simple stylized model considered here.  The same condition characterizes
investment behavior in a large set of models in the optimal "tree-cutting" literature, pioneered in
the analysis of public investment by Marglin (1967, 1970), and developed further in the real
options literature reviewed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994).   A basic insight of these models is that 9
the optimal time to cut a growing tree, once it has already been planted, is precisely when the
rate of return on the best alternative ( ) begins to exceed the rate at which the tree grows ( ). <1
The present model gives a learning interpretation to the "growth" of the tree, which generates
several additional predictions that can be used to test the model and refine understanding of
investment behavior more generally.
  The two parts of equation (5) drive the two effects of interest rate changes in this model.
The second part shows that a reduction in   causes investors to cut trees later (postpone <
investment), because it is more likely that  .  The first part shows that a reduction in   also 1< <
makes more individuals plant trees (increasing the scale of investment), because more projects
have positive expected value.  These two effects are hard to see at the firm level because there
are discontinuous jumps in investment as   changes in this extensive-margin model.  To analyze <
how changes in   affect investment more intuitively, I now aggregate the model over <
heterogeneous firms and derive a smooth aggregate investment demand curve.
1.3   Aggregation
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of firms with heterogeneous prior probabilities
of success ( s) Assume that the density of  , denoted by  , is continuous and places -- ( - !! ! .   .Ð Ñ
non-zero weight on all  . Revenues from investment in each state and the learning -! − Ò!ß"Ó   
technology are identical across firms.  In addition, assume for now that each firm's profit
9See, for example, Cukierman (1980), Bernanake (1983), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1988), Demers
(1991), Leahy (1993), and Bertola and Caballero (1994).12
realization is independent of other firms' outcomes, so firms can ignore the behavior of other
firms when making investment decisions.
  Under these assumptions, it follows that each firm follows Lemma 1 in determining its
investment rule.  The period 1 investment decisions of each firm can be identified by computing
the action   that maximizes   for each  .   This allows us to characterize the decisions .Ð . à Ñ Z -- !!
10
of all firms in the economy by a single threshold value   that determines who invests in period -‡
!
1 and who does not, as shown in Figure 2.  The next lemma establishes this result formally.
Lemma 2  There is a unique   at which the value of investing equals that of postponing. -!
‡
    In period 1, firms with   delay their investment decision. -- ! ! 
*




























FIGURE 2. EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR IN THE ECONOMY
  Investment behavior in the economy follows a simple pattern:  Confident firms (  high) -!
do not want to forego profits by delaying and invest immediately.  The remaining firms, who are
10Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent figures use the parameter values given in this figure.13
less certain about whether they have a profitable project, choose to wait and decide what to do in
the next period based on the information they observe.  The threshold   thus determines the -‡
!
scale of investment in the economy.
  It follows from Lemma 2 that aggregate period 1 investment is  




!  (6) (-
  Note that "period 1" investment is always equal to "current" investment; in other words,
the economy is always currently in period 1.  The reason is that the only state variable in any
firm's dynamic programming problem, irrespective of when it started learning, is its current
belief, which we call  .   Firms that existed prior to the current period and already acquired -! 11
information about their projects simply have a different value of  .  Hence, we use the terms -!
"period 1 investment" and "current investment" interchangeably below.
2   Interest Rates and Investment Demand
  In the model above, the level of current (period 1) aggregate investment is  a always 
backward-bending function of the interest rate.  Irrespective of the underlying parameters, MÐ<Ñ
has an upward-sloping segment from   to   followed by a downward sloping <œ! <œ< ! ‡
segment thereafter.
Proposition 1  Investment demand is a backward-bending function of the interest rate.





rÐ<Ñ œ  _





11With a finite decision horizon, the current period   is also a state variable, but with appropriate redefinition of  >X
the current belief remains a sufficient statistic to compute investment behavior.
12More precisely, `M
`< G
V œ! < "  for  , the uninteresting case in which the interest rate is so high that investing is
"
suboptimal even in the good state.14
  To see the intuition for this result, first note that if  , no one invests in the first <œ!
period.  Firms certain of success ( ) are indifferent between postponing and investing -! œ"
today, and all firms with lower priors must therefore strictly prefer delay (Lemma 2).  Hence,
MÐ< œ!Ñœ!.  In this stylized model, there is no reason to forego the free information one gets
by waiting and learning if  .  Increasing   from   raises the cost of learning by delaying <œ! < <œ!
and   aggregate investment by making the most confident firms invest immediately.  At increases




no one invests.  Since few firms invest when   is low or high, it follows that   is non- <M Ð < Ñ
monotonic.
  A natural concern with this result is that the prediction that investment falls to zero at low
interest rates is empirically implausible.  However, when certain unrealistic assumptions of the
stylized model are relaxed, this prediction disappears, while the backward-bending shape of MÐ<Ñ
remains intact.  Two differences between the stylized model and the real world are important in
this respect.  First, some types of investment, such as replacement of depreciating machines,
involve virtually no learning.  This component of investment has a conventional downward-
sloping relationship with  .  In a more general model that allows for both non-learning and <
learning investment, total investment is positive at  .  Nonetheless,   remains upward- <œ! M Ð < Ñ





rÐ<Ñ œ  _
learning component, there are other non-interest costs to delay such as research expenditures and
loss of profits due to competition that are ignored in the model above.  Incorporating these other
costs eliminates the prediction that  , because the most confident investors will not MÐ< œ!Ñœ!
want to incur these additional costs at any interest rate.  In section 3.2, I show that   remains MÐ<Ñ
backward-bending provided that these costs are not too large.  I proceed here with the stylized
model that abstracts from non-learning investment and other waiting costs since the main
intuitions are most transparent in this setting.15
  Having discussed why   is non-monotonic, I now explain why it has a  MÐ<Ñ backward-
bending all  shape more precisely.  If a given manager has   such that  ; ;  for  -- - !! ! ZÐ Ñ Ð 6 Ñ 3Z
< ! < , his behavior is unresponsive to changes in   and he does not affect the aggregate
investment demand curve.  Therefore, to understand how the shape of   emerges from MÐ<Ñ
microeconomic decisions, restrict attention to firms that do invest for some value of  .   To < 13
analyze the firm's behavior, let us examine how the two payoff functions,   and  ZÐà Ñ ZÐ 6 à Ñ 3 -- !!
change with respect to  .  Decomposing   into the NPV ( ) and learning ( ) <
` Ö ÐÑ  Ð 6 Ñ × ` ÐÑ ` Ð 6 Ñ
`< ` `
Z3 Z Z3 Z  
rr
effects gives:
`Ö Ð Ñ Ð6Ñ×
`<
œRTZP
Z3 Z  
(7)
where
RTZ œ Ö V Ð" ÑV ×!
"
Ð"  <Ñ
P œ ÐD ÑÖ  ×  Ð"  Ñ ÐD ÑÖ  ×  !
#V G #V G
Ð"  <Ñ Ð"  <Ñ Ð"  <Ñ Ð"  <Ñ
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(8)
The NPV effect makes an increase in   reduce the value of immediate investment, as in static <
investment models.  The learning effect arises because the value of delaying is also affected by
changes in the interest rate.  The two terms of   reflect the fact that an increase in   causes the P<
proceeds of investment at   to be discounted more steeply and also reduces the value of the >œ#
investment at   in period 2 dollars.  Via the   effect, a higher   reduces  , creating a >œ# P < ZÐ 6 Ñ
force that counteracts the conventional effect by making immediate investment   attractive. more
  These expressions show that  he magnitude of   diminishes relative to the magnitude t PÐ<Ñ
of   as   gets larger.  Hence, for any given  , there is exactly   value  at which RTZÐ<Ñ < < -! one
RTZÐ <Ñœ P Ð < Ñ ZÐ Ñ Ð 6 Ñ .  This implies that for a given firm,  ;  and  ;  intersect for at 3Z -- !!
most two values of  , say   and  .  The individual investment demand curves thus all << Ð Ñ< Ð Ñ P! Y! --
have the same form: invest iff  , as shown in Figure 3.  The source of the <Ð Ñ Ÿ < Ÿ <Ð Ñ P! Y! --
13Such firms exist: For -! œ" ßZÐ 3 à ÑZÐ 6 à Ña <!Êb " ZÐ 3 à ÑZÐ 6 à Ñ <! -- - -- !! !! !
ww w    s.t.   for some   by
continuity.16
non-monotonicity with respect to   is that a small increase in   causes   to fall  << Ð 6 Ñ Z more than
Z3 Z ÐÑ <Ð Ñ < Ð 6 Ñ  at  , increasing period 1 investment by firm  , but an increase in   causes   to P! ! --
fall   at  , reducing the level of investment by the same firm. less than Z3 ÐÑ < Ð Ñ Y! -
C. Individual Investment Demands

















B. Individual Expected Payoffs vs. r A. Individual Expected Payoffs vs. r






















































0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
FIGURE 3.  EFFECT OF INTEREST RATE ON PERIOD 1 INVESTMENT DEMAND
Notes: Firms compare   and   for each value of   (A,B) and compute their investment ZZ 3 Ð6Ñ Ð Ñ <
demands as functions of   (C).  Summing these step functions horizontally yields   (D). <M Ð < Ñ
  It can be shown that   is decreasing in   and   is increasing in   -- more <Ð Ñ <Ð Ñ P! ! Y! ! -- --
confident firms have a larger range of interest rates for which they finding immediate investment
optimal.  At the extremes, investors with   strictly prefer   for any  , whereas -!
V
G œ" <−Ð ! ß " Ñ 3
"
investors with   prefer not to invest  .  There is exactly one   such that -- ! !
w œ! a <!
<Ð Ñ œ <Ð Ñ Ð Ñ Ð 6 Ñ <œ <Ð Ñ œ <Ð Ñ PY ! ! PY !! !!
ww ‡ ww -- - - -- .  For this firm,  ;  and  ;  are tangent at  .  The Z3 Z
- -- ! !
w‡ ‡ w
!  firm invests   if  .    is maximized at   because all firms who have   also only <œ< M Ð < Ñ < 
invest at   by Lemma 2. <‡
  Summing the individual non-monotonic step functions horizontally generates a smooth
aggregate investment demand curve.  Aggregate investment demand is a backward-bending17
function of   because the firm-level investment demand curves are non-monotonic step functions <
that are strictly nested within each other as   falls, as shown in Figure 3.  The slope of  -! MÐ<Ñ
approaches +  as   tends to   because the most confident investors have little to gain by _< !
learning and immediately jump into the market when a small cost of delay is introduced.
  Note that in contrast to investment demand, the value of the firm is a strictly downward
sloping function of the interest rate, because both   and   rise when   falls.  Lower ZÐÑ ZÐ 6 Ñ < 3
interest rates essentially lead to more investment in information rather than physical capital such
as equipment and structures, ultimately yielding higher profit rates.  If the measure of
"investment" is broadened to include the value of information, the conventional prediction that
higher interest rates lower investment still holds.  However, from a normative perspective, the
distinction between investment in information and physical capital could be important.  If a
policy maker's goal is to stimulate job creation or aggregate demand, or if physical investment
leads to spillovers that raise growth, the amount of investment in equipment and structures itself
may matter.   Therefore, while the results of this paper are in some sense empirical claims 14
related to the measurement of investment, they also have real implications for economic welfare.
3   Extensions
3.1 Scale choice
  To incorporate scale choice at the firm level, assume that each firm can set investment in
periods 1 and 2,   and  , at any positive value.  The restriction that investment must be positive MM "#
captures irreversibility.  There are two states of the world, which differ in the mean price at
which the output good can be sold ( ).  Investments generate a profit stream for   periods. An :X . T
14This is particularly clear when changes in   lead to compositional effects, as in section 3.3.  If firms switch to <
slower construction methods because   is low, building permits fall.  The fact that building permits are perceived as <
an indicator of the economy's strength suggests that this change in behavior could have real economic
consequences.18
investment of   generates a profit of  ( ) for   periods in state  , starting in period 2 (one M: 0 M X "" T . .
period after investment). A further incremental investment of   in period 2 changes the profit M#
stream to  ( ) in periods   to  . Irreversibility of investment is a meaningful :0M M $ X  # . "# T
restriction only when  , so assume that this condition holds below. X # T
  The scale problem has a solution only if   is concave, i.e., the marginal return to 0ÐMÑ
investment is diminishing. This concavity can arise from technological constraints or from a
downward-sloping demand curve where price falls as supply rises.  The information revelation
structure of the model is the same as in section 2: A signal   is observed at the end of period 1 D
and beliefs are then updated.  Let the ex-ante probability of state 1 be given by    We can now -!Þ
generalize Proposition 1.
Proposition 2  MÐ < Ñ "  is backward-bending when firms choose scale.
  To understand this result intuitively, recall that the key step in the proof in the extensive-
margin case was to show that investment is zero at both low   and high  .  This continues to hold <<
here: Since there is no non-interest cost to delay in this simple model, there is no reason to invest
immediately if  .  In other words, profit-maximizing firms will rationally choose a scale of 0 <œ!
investment in period 1, implying  .  Similarly, if   is sufficiently high, investment is M Ð< œ !Ñ œ ! < "
undesirable.  Hence, investment-demand must be a non-monotonic function of  .  More <
generally, in an environment with other costs of waiting or non-learning investment, the scale of
investment is relatively low at both low   and high  , yielding a non-monotonic   curve with << M Ð < Ñ "
MÐ <œ! Ñ! " .
  To see why the main result does not change when scale choice is permitted, it is helpful
to consider the following alternative model of scale choice.  Suppose a firm has many projects in
which it can invest, some of which have higher probabilities of success than others.  The firm
must make a binary decision about each individual project but can choose the total number of
projects to take up.  As the firm raises investment, it is forced to choose projects with lower19
probabilities of success, making its profits a concave function of investment, as in the continuous
scale-choice model.  Since each project decision is made independently, investment decisions are
determined exactly as in Lemma 2.  Consequently, the total scale of investment by this firm,
MÐ < Ñ 0 , has the same form as equation (6), the expression for aggregate investment in the original
model where several small firms make investment decisions on different projects.  Firms are
divisible, so total investment is identical if many small firms make decisions about one project
each or one big firm makes investment decisions on several projects.
  Since   has the same form as (6), it follows that it also has the same backward- MÐ < Ñ 0
bending shape.  Put differently, the original aggregate model with extensive-margin choices at
the microeconomic level effectively contained a scale choice in the aggregate, so it already
contained the intensive-margin ("plant fewer trees") effect of increasing  .  Modelling this effect <
at the firm level instead of the aggregate level does not change the result.
3.2 Competition
  In the stylized model, investors enjoy pure rents from their investments.  While patent
and copyright protection limit competition in some cases, in practice most firms face some
degree of competition in the long run.  Competition reduces the option value of delay, since rents
cannot persist indefinitely in equilibrium.  Hence, it is important to investigate whether the
backward-bending result holds when the returns to investment are determined endogenously in
competitive equilibrium.
  To model competition, let us return to the setting where firms with different product
concepts (e.g. different drugs to treat a specific disease) make binary investment decisions.
Firms must make a decision to invest within two periods, indexed by    Each firm enters > œ "ß#Þ
period 1 with a prior probability of success of  .  There is a distribution of  s to capture -- !!
heterogeneous expectations as in the basic model.  Each firm receives an independent signal
about demand for its productat the end of period 1 which is used to update beliefs.20
  Investment in period   yields revenues in period  .  Each firm that invests in period  >>  " >
ends up with either a good product that sells for   in period   or a bad product that is :>  " >
worthless (sells for $0).  Prices are determined by cumulative supply.  Let   denote aggregate M>
investment in period   and   denote cumulative investment up to and including period  .  The >M > -
>
inverse-demand function for good products made in period   is given by an arbitrary downward- >




  To capture free entry in the long run, assume that profits are bid to zero after the first
period in which a particular product is sold.  After this point, other firms can replicate the
technology, forcing the original firm to sell at cost.  A firm that invests in period 1 thus has a
chance to earn positive profits in period 2 only; firms that invest in period 2 can earn positive
profits in period 3 only.  The one-period lag captures adjustment costs which prevent
competitors from bidding away infra-marginal quasi-rents (short run surplus) by selling an
identical product instantly.  Note that this model of competition parallels neoclassical
competitive production theory, where producer surplus is positive in the short run and falls to
zero in the long run.  The pharmaceutical industry is a good example to keep in mind for
concreteness: First-movers can earn large profits in the short run (e.g. Aspirin until generics are
introduced), while subsequent firms with slightly different products can also earn temporary
rents (Tylenol, Advil, Motrin) until their profits are bid away by generics as well.
  This setup allows us to write the expected profit from immediate investment ( ) and 3
learning ( ) for a firm with prior   as: 6 -!








I first establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this model.  In equilibrium, all
firms with  ,  at the market price vector  invest in period 1, and markets ZÐ ÑZÐ 6 Ñ Ð :ß:Ñ 3,-- !! " #
15This model is equivalent to one where prices depend on the supply of good products rather than total investment
because there is a monotonic link between   and the supply of good products, and   is an arbitrary function. M: Ð M Ñ --
>>21
clear in each period.  Investment behavior in the economy follows a pattern similar to that in the
base case.
Lemma 3  In period 1 equilibrium, there is a unique price vector   and threshold   at Ð: ß: Ñ "# !
‡ -
  which  . ZÐ 3 ß ÑœZÐ 6 ß Ñ! -- ‡‡
!!
    Firms with   delay their investment decision. -- ! ! 
*
    Firms with   invest in period 1. -- ! !  
*
  The key point of Lemma 3 is that the marginal investor in period 1 equilibrium earns
strictly positive expected profits from immediate investment.  Unlike in the neoclassical model
of competition, profits are not driven to zero at the margin in the period 1 equilibrium.  To
understand this result, first consider period 2 decisions.  Since there is no further option to delay,
a firm invests in period 2 if its expected return to investment at the market-clearing price exceeds
the cost of investment.  Consequently, there is a threshold value   such that only firms with -"
‡
updated probabilities of success   invest in period 2.  The marginal firm with belief  -- - "" "
‡‡ 
earns zero profits in equilibrium.  But the infra-marginal firms who have higher  s earn positive -"
profits in expectation.  These firms are able to earn short-run quasi-rents despite being in a
competitive market because they have a better technology (higher  ) that cannot be instantly -"
replicated by other firms.  For example, they might have access to more fertile land, a better
chemical compound, or better human capital that gives them a short-run advantage.  However,
after one period passes, other firms are able to observe the technology of successful firms, and
free entry leads to zero profits.
  Now turn to period 1 behavior.  There is some probability that the marginal investor in
period 1 will be one of the infra-marginal investors in period 2.  Hence the value of postponing
must be strictly positive for this indifferent firm.  The reason that NPV is not driven to zero in
the period 1 equilibrium is again heterogeneity in success probabilities. Other firms are free to22
enter the market and try to capture the positive rents, but they have lower probabilities of success
than the indifferent firm, and therefore opt to delay instead.
  Since the option value of delaying is positive for the marginal period 1 investor in
equilibrium, changes in   continue to affect that firm's behavior via both an NPV and learning <
effect, as in the basic model.  The existence of these two opposing forces suggests thatperiod 1
investment demand,  , may be non-monotonic in competitive equilibrium.  This result MÐ < Ñ "
cannot be established as easily as in the baseline model because there is now a non-interest cost
to waiting, so   is no longer  .   Even at a zero interest rate, the most confident (highest M Ð< œ !Ñ ! " 16
-!) firms will invest immediately to take advantage of the high initial price they can extract.
Nonetheless, one can obtain a simple condition under which the investment demand curve in this
model is upward-sloping at low  . <
Proposition 3  Let   and   denote the success probabilities of the marginal (indifferent) -- ‡‡
!"
    investors in periods 1 and 2, respectively.  Then   if at  , `M Î`<Ð< œ !Ñ  ! < œ ! "
-"- - ‡‡ ‡
!! " ÐÑ  (9)
This condition requires that the marginal investor in period 1 have a significantly higher success
probability than the marginal investor in period 2.  Since the marginal investor in period 2 earns
zero profits in equilibrium, this condition guarantees that the marginal investor in period 1 can
gain substantial rents by delaying and investing in period 2, since he is likely to be an infra-
marginal investor in that period.
  To understand why (9) is required intuitively, it is helpful to consider two extreme
examples.  First, suppose signals are perfect, so that  .  In this case, the distribution of "- ÐÑ œ " ‡
!
-" is a degenerate two-point distribution, and if supply is sufficiently large, price is driven down
to   in the second period. Since firms cannot earn any profits if they delay investment, the :œ G 2
option to delay is worthless.  The model collapses into the conventional single-period model,
16However, at very high  , it remains the case that investment is suboptimal for all firms, so aggregate investment <
falls to zero as  .  Hence,   must have a downward-sloping segment in the competitive model. <p_ MÐ<Ñ23
where   has only a conventional cost-of-capital (scale) effect and   is strictly downward <M Ð < Ñ
sloping.  Correspondingly, (9) does not hold in this case because  .  This example -‡
" œ"
illustrates that the "timing effect" of   can emerge only if delaying is a "real option" that has <
value in equilibrium.  Condition (9) essentially guarantees that the option to delay has value.
  Now consider a second example, where signals are imperfect.  Suppose the demand curve
for the good product is
:œ 0 Ð MÑ  O >
-
>
where   is a constant and  /  so that demand is downward-sloping.  Suppose the cost O` 0 ` M  ! -
>
of investment is
GœG  O !
"
#
In this example,   controls the variance of payoffs: High   yields higher profits in the good OO
state but a bigger loss in the bad state.  The following result establishes that (9) holds when
payoff uncertainty is sufficiently high, implying that   is upward-sloping at low  : MÐ<Ñ <
Corollary to Proposition 3  For   sufficiently large,  O` M Î ` < Ð < œ ! Ñ  !
The mechanics driving this result are straightforward.  As   becomes large, the threshold for O
investment in period 2 approaches   because firms earn approximately the same amount in -‡ "
# 1 œ
the good state ( ) as they lose in the bad state.  In period 1, increased uncertainty makes delay O
#
more attractive for each firm, raising the threshold for investment  .  Therefore, as the amount -‡
!




that (9) is eventually satisfied.  Intuitively, in a very risky environment, the incentive to delay
and acquire information is large, so only the most confident investors take advantage of high
equilibrium prices in period 1.  However, once there is no further opportunity to learn, many
lower-capability firms are willing to take risky but positive NPV risks, creating large infra-
marginal rents in the second period for the marginal period 1 investor.  These large rents become
less valuable when interest rates rise, compelling the marginal firm to start investing24
immediately when   rises from  , and raising aggregate investment in competitive << œ !
equilibrium.
  The model of competition analyzed here is obviously quite stark, but the results can be
extended to richer settings where entry dynamics are endogenous and prices fall gradually as
competitors enter the market.  The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that   is MÐ<Ñ
upward-sloping at small   in competitive equilibrium if firms can earn significant temporary <
rents.  More generally, as long as the non-interest costs of delay -- whether from competitive
forces, research costs, or other sources -- are small relative to the rents earned by the marginal
period 1 investor,   is non-monotonic.  The shape of   thus depends on whether firms MÐ<Ñ MÐ<Ñ
actually earn temporary rents in practice and treat delaying as a valuable option.  Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many successful firms do earn revenues far above costs at least in certain
industries with large fixed costs and substantial uncertainty, such as software, pharmaceuticals,
apparel, and media.  More systematic evidence that firms value the option to delay at the margin
is given in section 4.
3.3 Investment Composition Decisions
  We have assumed thus far that firms make a one-dimensional decision about the scale of
investment.  However, in practice, firms make many choices about projects beyond scale.  For
instance, they may choose technologies for construction, speed of delivery to market, etc.  To see
how these "investment composition" decisions affect the shape of  , consider a model where MÐ<Ñ
firms can choose between two construction methods, A and B.  Method A requires the use of
expensive building materials and is fast (e.g. 1 year to build).  Method B involves less real
investment but is slower (e.g. 2 years to build).  At  , time is costless, so the firm will use <œ!
only method B.  When   is very high, time is precious, and the firm will use only method A.  For <
intermediate interest rates, the firm will use a combination of these two methods.  Since method
A involves more real investment than method B, the composition effect, holding scale fixed,25
makes   strictly upward sloping.  As the scale effect dominates at high   -- for sufficiently MÐ<Ñ <
high  , it is best not to invest with any technology --   is downward-sloping for high   when <M Ð < Ñ <
scale is endogenous.  However, composition effects lengthen the upward-sloping segment of
MÐ<Ñ <  and raise the investment-maximizing   generated by the basic model with only learning ‡
effects.
  In the tree-cutting and planting analogy of section 2, composition choices are the kinds of
trees one plants (oak or apple).  Increases in the interest rate have three effects in this
environment: (1) Plant fewer trees; (2) Cut trees later; (3) Plant trees that mature later.  Effects 2
and 3 act to make   upward-sloping at low interest rates.  Generalizing the model to allow MÐ<Ñ
composition choices thus reinforces the main result, and illustrates that learning is not the only
reason that firms may reduce current investment in response to an interest rate cut.
4   Evidence for Timing Effects
 
  The upward-sloping portion of   emerges only if firms actually compare the value of MÐ<Ñ
immediate investment with the discounted value of future investment when making decisions in
practice (and do not simply follow NPV rules).  Hence, a natural place to start in assessing the
empirical relevance of this model of investment is to ask whether companies take into account
the option to delay investment.  There is now considerable evidence supporting this hypothesis.
For example, Coy (1999) describes several examples where companies such as Airbus, Hewlett-
Packard, Chevron, and Enron made investment decisions using an explicit real-options analysis.
Summers (1987) and Poterba and Summers (1995) surveyed Fortune 1,000 CEOs about their
business practices and found that hurdle rates for immediate investment are 2-3 times higher than
the user cost of capital.  McDonald (2000) argues that the hurdle rate methods used by many
companies serve as good rules-of-thumb for real-options calculations.  These studies suggest that
most firms do not simply maximize NPV, and at least implicitly value the option to wait and
acquire more information.26
  Several studies also give direct evidence that firms actively choose the   of time
investment.  Hellman and Puri (2000) find that the mean time-to-market for startup firms in
Silicon Valley is 2.6 years, but various factors such as sources of finance affect this time
significantly.  In addition, microeconomic and macroeconomic studies have shown that firms
wait longer to invest in more uncertain environments, as the model of this paper and real options
theory predicts (e.g. Pindyck and Solimano 1993; Bulan, Mayer, and Somerville 2003).
  The very fact that the value of delay is taken into account indicates that the option to
delay is not worthless at the margin in competitive equilibrium.  In addition, interest rate changes
must affect the timing of investment at least for firms that explicitly compare the discounted
values of investment options.  To complement this reasoning, I now describe a set of recent
studies which provide direct evidence on the timing effects of interest rate changes.
  In recent work independent of this paper, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2004) construct
a model of initial public offerings (IPOs) which predicts that the time of IPO investment should
be positively related to   at low levels of the interest rate and negatively related to   at higher <<
levels of the interest rate.   They use time-series variation over the 20th century in the interest 17
rate in the United States, and document a backward-bending relationship between   and time to <
IPO, precisely as the model predicts.18
  Moel and Tufano (2002) also examine the effect of time-series variation in   on <
investment decisions.  They study the timing of gold mine closures in North America between
1988 and 1997.  Since closing a mine involves a large fixed cost, profit-maximizing firms with
the option to delay should take the discounted value of expected future cashflows into account
when making such decisions.  When interest rates are high, the future matters less relative to the
17The intuition underlying the Jovanovic-Rousseau result is somewhat similar to that here, but the premises and
structure of the two models are quite different.  Given their focus on the timing of IPOs in particular, their paper
does not model learning, heterogeneity across firms, and aggregation as in the model of investment here.  The
papers also differ in the discussion of extensions and additional comparative statics.
18Jovanovic and Rousseau do not address the potential endogeneity of the interest rate explicitly. However, they
show that   has little effect on incumbent firms' investment in the time series.  Since IPOs are a small fraction of <
total investment, autonomous shocks to IPO investment are unlikely to affect  .  Given that total investment is <
uncorrelated with   in the time series,   can arguably be taken as exogenous to changes in IPO investment. <<27
present, and the immediate costs of closing a mine are more likely to outweigh the potential
benefits.  Hence, if firms take interest rates into account when timing decisions, mine closures
should be less frequent when interest rates are high.  Moel and Tufano find that firms are indeed
more likely to keep mines open in periods when interest rates are high.
  Capozza and Li (2001) test a model of real-estate development where interest-rate
changes have non-monotonic effects on construction for reasons related to those described
above.   They provide cross-sectional evidence for timing effects using data on building permits 19
in the United States from 1981 to 1989.  They first estimate the interest-elasticity of building
permits for each metropolitan area during this period.  The interest-elasticities vary substantially
across metropolitan areas.  The elasticities are most negative in areas in with minimal price
volatility and most positive in the most risky metropolitan areas.  Hence, timing effects -- which
drive up the interest elasticity -- seem to be most important in risky environments.  This finding
is consistent with the model's prediction that timing effects should be larger when firms face
uncertainty and the option to delay is very valuable (see section 5.1).
  In another cross-sectional study, Hellman and Puri (2000) examine variation in the time
to market for startup firms in Silicon Valley in the 1990s.  They show that firms backed by
venture capitalists, who charge a high effective rate of interest, rush their product to market
much more quickly than firms financed through other traditional means.  Hellman and Puri
conduct several tests using data on ex-ante characteristics to rule out the hypothesis that this
difference in time-to-invest is a selection effect caused by differences in the types of firms that
seek VC funding vs. other sources of funding.  They conclude that VC funding -- which comes
with a high interest rate -- has a causal effect on time to invest, again supporting the main timing
intuition of the present model.
19Capozza and Li study a continuous-time model with stochastic price that builds on Arnott and Lewis's (1979)
model of land development and other real options models.  They show that the effect of changes in   on the speed of <
investment is indeterminate in this setting.  The most important difference between these papers and the present
study is that they do not show that   has a backward-bending shape.  In addition, they do not model learning, MÐ<Ñ
aggregate over heterogenous firms, or consider the extensions such as competition and other comparative statics
studied here.28
5   Additional Empirical Implications
  This section presents a set of testable comparative statics that could be used to test the
empirical relevance of the model for aggregate investment more systematically in future work.
These predictions are derived in the basic model of section 2 for simplicity.
5.1 Potential to Learn
  I first show that an increase in   is most likely to increase investment in environments <
with a high potential to learn.  A formal definition of changes in the "potential to learn" is
necessary to operationalize the comparative statics analysis.  Intuitively, a firm can learn more
rapidly if "signal noise" is lower, i.e. if it easier to distinguish whether   is drawn from   or  . D0 1
Recall that any manager's second period decision is the outcome of a hypothesis test.  We will
say that "signal noise" rises if the power of the test,   =  , falls while the type 1 "ÐBÑ 1ÐDÑ.D '
B
_
error rate,  , rises for   cutoff values   below the point at which   and   are !ÐBÑ œ 0ÐDÑ.D B 0 1 '
B
_ all
indistinguishable.  Formally, let   denote the level of signal noise with densities   and  , =Ð0ß1Ñ 0 1
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w this definition is an incomplete ordering since it does not
rank all distributions in terms of signal noise. A leading example of an increase in signal noise   
according to this definition is a rightward shift of   or a leftward shift of   in Figure 1. 1ÐDÑ 0ÐDÑ
  Before turning to the relationship between signal noise and  , it is useful to first `M
`<
establish the connection between signal noise and the level of   itself. M
Lemma 4      An increase in signal noise increases current investment29
= Ð 0ß 1Ñ= Ð 0ß 1ÑÊM Ð 0ß 1ÑM Ð 0ß 1Ñ 11 22 11 22  
  When signal noise rises, a firm's ability to learn about the true value of   by waiting is .
reduced.  This reduces the value of delaying investment, making aggregate investment rise.
Cukierman (1980) gives an analogous result: Increases in the variance of earnings reduce current
investment by raising the value of delay.
  How does an increase in signal noise affect the shape of  ?  To build intuition, MÐ<Ñ
consider the extreme case of totally uninformative signals ( ).  In this case, the model 0œ1
collapses into the neoclassical model and the   curve is downward-sloping, i.e.  .  This MÐ<Ñ < œ! ‡
observation suggests that the potential to learn should be positively associated with  ; that is, <‡
the upward-sloping segment of the investment-demand curve should be larger in industries or
times where there is more to be learned.  The following proposition establishes that this is indeed
the case provided that the payoff in the bad state is sufficiently low, or, equivalently, the
variance of returns is sufficiently high relative to the expected return.
Proposition 4   s.t.if  , a reduction in signal noise raises  : bV  ! V  V < !! !
‡
=Ð0 ß1 Ñ  =Ð0 ß1 Ñ Ê <  < ## "" #"
‡‡
  To see the intuition for this result, observe that changes in signal noise affect only  , ZÐ 6 Ñ
leaving  unaffected for each firm.  An increase in   is more likely to raise aggregate ZÐ 3 Ñ <
investment if it tends to reduce   more than  , making immediate investment preferable, ZÐ 6 Ñ ZÐ 3 Ñ
for a given set of parameters.  When signal uncertainty is lowered,   changes in two ways. ZÐ 6 Ñ
First, firms have a higher probability of investing in the good state in period 2 (  rises).  Second, "
firms have a lower probability of investing in the bad state (  falls).  The first effect makes !
expected period 2 profits more sensitive to the interest rate, since there is a higher probability of
earning revenues in the good state.  The second effect goes in the opposite direction, since there
is a   probability of earning revenues in the bad state.  If   is small, the second effect is lower V!30
small in magnitude relative to the first, so   is more sensitive to   overall.  For instance when ZÐ 6 Ñ <
Vœ ! < ! , an increase in   has no effect at all on revenues in the bad state.  Therefore, provided
that   is small, an increase in   is more likely to reduce   relative to   for each firm and V < ZÐ 6 Ñ ZÐ 3 Ñ !
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FIGURE 4.  SIGNAL NOISE AND THE SHAPE OF MÐ<Ñ
This figure shows   for four pairs of signal distributions   and  MÐ<Ñ 0 1Þ
The distributions are Normal with a mean of   for   and   for   and .. !" 01
a standard deviation of 16.  As   rises, signal uncertainty falls. .. "! 
  The low   condition on the result requires that the variance of earnings be high relative V!
to the mean profit rate, which is essentially a requirement that good information about the state
of the world is valuable.  The variance of profits is typically quite high in practice: Investments
usually either have very large payoffs or are complete failures.  Hence, the important empirical
implication is that interest rate increases are more likely to stimulate investment in industries or
times where the potential to learn is greater, as shown in Figure 4.
5.2 Short Run vs. Long Run31
  I now turn to the effects of changes in   on total investment over a longer horizon, taking <
into account changes in investment behavior beyond the current period.  In this case, it is
necessary to consider the more general   period formulation of the model instead of the two X
period special case discussed above.  In this more general model, the firm has the option to delay
investment in every period from 1 to  .   As noted earlier, the preceding results apply X"20
when   as well.  In the   period model, total investment from period 1 to   is X# X >
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where   is the probability that a firm with prior   ends up investing in period  .  The TÐ Ml Ñ = "=! ! --
next proposition analyzes the relationship between  and  . M"ß>  <
Proposition 5
   is a backward-bending function of    : (i) MÐ < Ñ < a >  X "> ,





`M  and 
"ß>
  The upward sloping portion of the   curve becomes smaller at   rises: (ii)  MÐ < Ñ > "> ,
 < < "> "
‡‡
,, t + 1
  The first part of the proposition is driven by the same two effects that make the response
of investment demand in period 1 to a change in   non-monotonic.  For any  , a decrease in <>  X
< creates two opposing forces: first, the cost of capital falls, compelling more entrepreneurs to
invest at any given time; second, the cost of waiting falls, encouraging investors to wait until
they are more certain that they will make money.  The waiting effect reduces total investment
between periods 1 and   by causing investors to postpone investment beyond  .  As explained >>
above, the waiting effect dominates when the interest rate is very low and the cost of capital
effect dominates when the interest rate is higher, resulting in a backward bending curve.  One
20See Lemma 1 in the appendix for details of the   period model. X32
way of seeing why the backward-bending result emerges here as well is to observe that if  0, <œ
all the firms will postpone their decision until   and  0 0; but if  , some firms XM Ð < œ Ñ œ <  ! "> ,
will find it optimal to invest.
  The second part of the proposition arises from the fact that the learning effect has a
smaller impact on the interest elasticity of investment demand over longer horizons.  The growth
in profits from delay diminishes over time because the marginal return to information falls as
more knowledge is accumulated.  When   is lowered, less confident investors may delay <
investment for a few periods to acquire information.  But some of these firms will eventually
decide to invest, since there is still a non-zero cost to delay and the potential benefits for further
information have fallen.  A reduction in   thus leads to temporary delays via the learning effect, <
making investment fall more in the short run relative to the long run.  The conventional cost of
capital effect therefore starts to dominate at lower levels of   in the long run, and the investment- <
maximizing   falls. <"ß>
‡ 21
  The important implication of this result is that the long run elasticity of investment
demand is more negative than the short run elasticity of investment demand when firms learn
over time.  If the near-zero existing estimates of the short-run interest elasticity of investment
demand are due to learning effects, interest rate reductions from policies that stimulate savings
could nonetheless increase investment over a longer horizon.22
5.3 Average Profit Rates
  In the neoclassical model, a higher interest rate increases the average rate of return of
investments that are undertaken by driving out low-NPV ventures.  This result also breaks down
when firms learn over time, providing another ancillary test of the learning model.
21Unlike learning effects, which die away in the long run as firms acquire perfect information, composition effects
may never subside.  Hence, when composition effects are permitted, the long-run investment demand curve may
continue to exhibit a substantial upward-sloping segment.
22Interestingly, Caballero (1994) and Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995) find that a higher cost of capital
reduces investment much more in the long run than the short run in the U.S.33
  To analyze the average rate of return, we must identify the level of ex-post profitable
( =1) and ex-post unprofitable ( =0) investment by specifying how frequently a project that a ..
manager expects to succeed with probability   actually does succeed.  A natural benchmark is -!
rational expectations:    In this case, the average (net) profit rate among T Ò œ" Óœ Þ -! .- !
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As established in Proposition 1, when  , an increase in the interest rate draws the marginal << ‡
investor with prior   into the period 1 pool of investors.  This firm has the lowest probability -‡
!Ð<Ñ
of success among the set of firms who are investing.  Consequently, it pulls down the average
rate of return in the overall pool.  Conversely, when  , an increase in   eliminates the << < ‡
marginal investor with prior  , who has the lowest probability of success in the pool of -‡
!Ð<Ñ
investors, increasing the average rate of return.
  The average observed profit rate on current investment is thus a backward-bending
function of  .  Building on earlier results, an increase in the interest rate is more likely to lower <
the average observed rate of return when the potential to learn is greater and in the short run
relative to the long run.
5.4 Temporary Interest Rate Changes
  The results above relate to permanent changes in the interest rate.  Variation in the
"permanent" interest rate can only be obtained cross-sectionally, e.g. by comparing across34
countries, or using low-frequency variation in the time series, as in Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2004).  In this section, I discuss a few comparative statics for temporary changes in the interest
rate that may be easier to test.  Proofs (available by request) are omitted since these results are
simple extensions of the preceding propositions.
  First consider the effect of a temporary   temporary increase in the interest unanticipated
rate.  Let   denote the per-period interest rate between periods   and  .  An unanticipated <" >  X ">
increase in   (holding fixed   in all other periods) is more likely to reduce current investment << ">
than a permanent increase in   because one can take advantage of lower future costs of capital by <
delaying investment.  If the potential to learn is sufficiently high,  ) is backward-bending, MÐ<">
with a smaller upward-sloping segment than  . When the potential to learn is low,   is MÐ<Ñ MÐ< Ñ ">
strictly downward-sloping.  The longer the duration of an interest rate change, the less the
incentive to postpone investment following a temporary increase, and the larger the range of
parameters over which   is upward-sloping. MÐ< Ñ ">
  Now consider the effect of a temporary   change in the interest rate that begins anticipated
in period   and lasts until period  .  An anticipated increase in   is more likely to raise =" >= < =>
current investment than a permanent change in   because one can take advantage of lower <
current costs of capital by investing immediately.  In fact, if the change is anticipated sufficiently
far in advance, current investment may be a strictly upward-sloping function of  .  In contrast, <=>
future investment falls when   rises because of the intertemporal substitution. <=>
  Together, these results indicate that the shape of the yield curve on bonds should have a
significant effect on current and future investment patterns.  The yield curve embodies investors'
expectations of current and future interest rates.  When the yield curve becomes steeper, current
investment should rise relative to subsequent investment.  Hence, variations in the shape of the
yield curve -- especially when coupled with cross-industry variation in learning potential -- can
provide powerful tests of model beyond the basic backward-bending   result. MÐ<Ñ
  A final set of predictions relates to the effect of tax changes.  In the neoclassical model,
taxes matter only through the user cost of capital.  In the present model, both the user cost and35
the discount rate matter, and tax policies may affect these two quantities differently.  For
example, accelerated depreciation provisions change the user cost but need not change the
discount rate (there is no additional incentive to delay from accelerated depreciation itself).
Hence, they should unambiguously raise investment.   In contrast, changes in the tax treatment 23
of capital income can affect equilibrium interest rates, thereby changing the discount rate and
user cost simultaneously.  Hence, these changes could generate non-monotonic investment
responses.  A more thorough examination of the relationship between tax policies and
investment behavior is left to future work.
6   Conclusion
  One of the central questions for tax and monetary policy makers is, "How will a policy
change that increases interest rates affect real investment?"  This paper has explored this
question in an environment where firms making irreversible investments learn over time.  In this
setting, real investment is a backward-bending function of the interest rate.  At low interest rates,
an increase in   raises the cost of learning and   investment by enlarging the set of < increases
projects for which the interest rate exceeds the rate of return to delay.
  Empirical studies of firm behavior have found that interest rate changes cause some firms
to change the timing of investments as the model predicts.  However, additional tests of the
model's auxiliary predictions are needed to determine whether it can help explain why empirical
estimates of the short-run interest elasticity of aggregate investment demand are so low.  Testing
whether temporary and permanent interest rates changes affect the timing of investment in
sectors with a high potential to learn may be a promising direction for future work.
23This point is empirically relevant because the clearest evidence that the cost of capital affects investment behavior
comes from tax reforms (e.g. Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994)).  Most of the reforms are changes in
depreciation allowances and investment tax credits, which arguably do not change the cost of delay.36
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Appendix A: Proofs for Basic Model
All proofs below apply for the general model with arbitrary decision horizon  .  The X
corresponding results discussed in the text are for the   case, unless otherwise noted. Xœ#
Proofs for section 3 (Extensions) are given in a separate appendix.  Note that   denotes the ->"
firm's prior in period  . >
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We begin by analyzing behavior in period  .  In period  , the payoff to investing   is XX Z Ð 3 Ñ X
computed using the updated belief   about the probability with which   occurs.  The -. XÐDÑ œ "
firm invests iff  , where ZÐ Ñ  ! X 3
  Z Ð Ñ œ Ð " Ð D Ñ Ñ Ð ! Ñ Ð D Ñ Ð " Ñ X 3 -- 11 11 ##
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Since   is monotonically increasing, the period   decision rule is:
1ÐDÑ
0ÐDÑ X
  Invest if  , where   is defined by  D D D œ X" X" X"
‡‡ 1ÐD Ñ
0ÐD Ñ Ð"Ñ












The remainder of the proof is done by backward induction starting with period  , where the X"
investor is faced with a 2 period decision problem.  We first show that the   functions have ZX"
the form claimed above.  In period  , there are 2 possible actions:   and  .    is X3 3 " 6 Z ÐÑ X"
computed by taking an expectation over the   function: 1X"
  ZÐ Ñ œ  Ð "  Ñ XX X " ! " ! " 3 Ð"Ñ Ð!Ñ -1 - 1
To compute  , integrate the expected payoff in period   over the prior density of  .  The ZÐ 6 Ñ D X" X
payoff in period   depends upon the action taken in period  which follows the decision rule XX ß
derived above:
Z Ð6Ñ œ Q+BÐZ Ð. ÑßZ Ð ÑÑ.7ÐDÑ œ Z Ð. Ñ  Z Ð ÑÑ.7ÐDÑ XX XX X " " " _ _ D
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  where  is the unconditional density on  . .7ÐDÑ œ 1ÐDÑ  Ð"  Ñ0ÐDÑ D -- !!
Ê Z Ð6Ñ œ 1ÐDÑ.D  Ð"  Ñ 0ÐDÑ.D× XX X " ! ! DD
__ -1 - 1 Ð"Ñ Ð!Ñ ''
X " X " HH
‡‡
We also need to show that the firm follows a threshold rule for investment in period  : X"
b DÐ D ß Þ Þ Þ DÑ Ð ß Dß Ñ œ Ð 6 ß Dß Ñ  unique  ,  defined byV V  s.t. that ‡‡ ‡
# # # " $  "  $  "  $ XX X XX X X X 3 --
investing is optimal iff  . D D X X #
‡
#
It is sufficient to show that   unique   s.t. V V  and that bÐ ß Ñ œ Ð 6 ß Ñ -- - ‡‡ ‡
# # # " " XX X XX 3
-- X X #
‡
#  makes investing optimal because by monotonicity of the likelihood ratio, this
implies that there is a unique   that satisfies the given expression, conditional on  . DX X #
‡
$ -
To see that there is a unique  : rewrite -X#
  ZÐ Ñ œ ,  Ð "  Ñ + XX X " # # 3 --
  ZÐ 6 Ñ œ ,  Ð "  Ñ + XX X " # #
ww --
where           ,œ , œT Ð M l œ" Ñ 11 XX X X " "
w Ð"Ñ Ð"Ñ .41
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Hence ,  ,    iff  . ZÐ Ñ  ZÐ 6 Ñ  XX XX X X " " # # #
‡
# 3 -- - -
Having characterized behavior in period  , we proceed to the general step: X"
  Given that  (-)has the form claimed, we will prove that  ( ) also has the same form. ZZ >> " -
First, clearly  . Z Ð Ñ œ Ð"Ñ  Ð"  Ñ Ð!Ñ >> > > > 3 -- " " 11
The expected payoff to learning,  , is computed by recognizing that one will maximize ZÐ 6 Ñ >
profits in the next period.  By the inductive assumption, the firm will invest in period   iff >"
D D D > >>
‡‡ , where   has already been computed.
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Finally, to complete the induction, we need to show that   unique   s.t. bD ‡
" >
V V  and that if   the investor will find it optimal to >> > > >> > " # # " " " "
‡‡ ‡ ÐßD ß Ñœ Ð 6 ßD ß Ñ D D 3 -- s
invest in period  .  Again, it is sufficient to show that   unique   s.t. >b -‡
" >
V V  and that  Invest. XX >> > > " "
‡‡ ‡
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As the proof is virtually identical to that above, we are brief:
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The combination of arguments above implies that    and consequently   are unique.  QED. -‡‡
" " >> D
Lemma 2  There is a unique   at which the value of investing equals that of postponing. -!
‡
    In period 1, firms with   postpone their investment decision. -- ! ! 
*
    Firms with   invest in period 1. -- ! !  
*
Proof
The proof follows directly from the second step of Lemma 1.  It was shown that in any period  , >
bÐ ß Ñ œ Ð 6 ß Ñ  Í  unique   s.t. V V  and that  Invest. --- - - ‡‡‡ ‡
" " " " " >>> > >> > 3
Applying this result to   gives the result. >œ"
Lemma 4      An increase in signal noise increases current investment
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reduction in signal noise that for any  ,   is higher under   than under  , = T ÐM l œ "Ñ Ð0 ß1 Ñ Ð0 ß1 Ñ 1 = . 22 11
while   is lower.  Hence, TÐ Ml œ! Ñ 1 = .
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!!! ;; 22 11
By Lemma 2, it follows that  .  As  , the result is established. -- - ‡w ‡
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Proposition 1  Investment demand is a backward-bending function of the interest rate.
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MÐ<Ñ MÐ!ÑœMÐ<Ñœ!  is continuous because it is a composition of continuous functions.  Since 
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Now differentiate   to obtain the second derivative: QÐ<Ñ
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implies the first term is negative in the expression above.  To evaluate the sign of the second47
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!Appendix B: Proofs for Extensions (Section 3)
Proposition 2 (Scale Choice)
Let p = λ0p1+(1−λ0)p0 denote the expected price ex-ante. Let us ﬁrst characterize the
ﬁrm’s optimal investment policy for a given interest rate r. In the second period, conditional
on observing z,t h eﬁrm updates its beliefs to λ1(z). It then chooses I2 to
max{λ1(z)p1 +( 1− λ1(z))p0}{
TP+1 X
t=1
f(I1 + I2) − f(I1)
(1 + r)t+1 } −
I2
1+r
At an interior optimum, I2 must satisfy the following ﬁrst order condition:
f




(1 + r)t =1
If there is no positive I2 > 0 that satisﬁes this condition, the concavity of f guarantees that
the optimal I2 =0 .L e t I∗(z)=I1 + I∗
2(z) denote the optimal total level of investment
conditional on observing a signal z.T h e n w e c a n w r i t e I∗
2(z,I1)=m a x ( I∗(z) − I1,0).
It is easy to show that the optimal investment level I∗
2(z) is monotonically increasing in
z. Hence, there is an optimal cutoﬀ value z∗ such that z<z ∗ implies I1 >I ∗ (z).L e t
σ(I1,z∗) denote the ex-ante probability that z>z ∗. Note that the rational expectations
condition implies Z
λ1(z)p1 +( 1− λ1(z))p0dm(z)=p
where dm(z) denotes the marginal distribution of z as in the text. With this notation, the


























(1 + r)t+1 −
f(I1)

















Claim (i): I1(r =0 )=0
Using the deﬁnition of V1, it follows that at r =0 ,
V1(r =0 )=−(1 − σ)I1 + K
where K is a term that does not depend on I1.S i n c e σ < 1 if λ0 < 1, it follows that
I∗
1(r =0 )=0as claimed.
Claim (ii): lim
r→0∂I1/∂r =+ ∞
Since the value function is already optimized over I∗(z) and I∗
2(z) at all z,e n v e l o p e








(1 + r)t+1 −
1








1 − (1 + r)−TP












TP(1 + r − σ)
(1 + r)TP − (1 + r)
]
49Note that ∂σ
∂r remains ﬁnite as r → 0 because ∂z∗






TP(1 + r − σ)
(1 + r)TP − (1 + r)
]=−∞
Finally, since f00 < 0 it follows that
lim
r→0∂I1/∂r =+ ∞
These two claims establish that I1(r) h a sa nu p w a r ds l o p i n gs e g m e n ta tl o wr and a
downward-sloping segment at high r. The uniqueness of the investment-maximizing in-
terest rate r∗ can be established along the lines of part (ii) of Proposition 1, completing the
proof.
Lemma 3 (Competition)
In period 2, a ﬁrm invests if the expected return to investment at the market-clearing












it follows that there is a unique cutoﬀ value λ
∗













In equilibrium, all ﬁrms with λ1 > λ
∗
1 invest, all other ﬁrms stay out, and the market clears
at the resulting price p2 by construction. This implies that for any ﬁrm with given prior λ0,
there is a cutoﬀ value z∗(λ0) such that the ﬁrm invests in period 1 iﬀ z>z ∗.
Now consider period 1 investment behavior. Let β(z∗(λ0)) =
R ∞
z∗ g(z)dz and α(z∗(λ0)) =
R ∞
z∗ f(z)dz denote the unconditional probability of investment in the good and bad states,
















Note that V (l,λ0) is strictly positive in equilibrium if λ0 > 0 because there is a non-zero
probability that the ﬁrm will have a posterior success probability greater than λ
∗
1. It follows
f r o mL e m m a2t h a tf o rag i v e np r i c ev e c t o r(p1,p 2),t h e r ei sau n i q u eλ
∗
0 such that ﬁrms
with λ0 > λ
∗
0 invest in period 1 and the remainder delay. Since ∂pt/∂Ic





0/∂p2 > 0 it follows that there is a unique price vector (p1,p 2) at which all ﬁrms are
optimizing and markets clear in both periods. Thus, equilibrium investment is characterized



























dV (i,λ0)/dr − dV (l,λ0)/dr




At r =0 , the denominator of this expression is:
















(1 + r)3 +
dp2/dr









0), N simpliﬁes at r =0to
N(r =0 ) |p-ﬁxed = λ
∗
0(r =0 ) β(λ
∗
0)p2 − C
if dpt/dr is zero. I now show that N(r =0 ) |p-ﬁxed =⇒ ∂I
∂r(r =0 )> 0 using a proof by
contradiction . Suppose that ∂I1
∂r (r =0 )< 0.I n t h i s c a s e ,
dp1/dr > dp2/dr > 0
because ∂Ic
1/∂I1 =1and ∂Ic
2/∂I1 < 1 and ∂pt/∂Ic
t < 0. It follows that N(r =0 )> 0 when
p is variable. Since N>0 and D>0,
dλ∗
0
dr < 0, which implies ∂I1
∂r (r =0 )> 0.B u t t h i s
contradicts the supposition. Therefore ∂I1
∂r (r =0 )> 0 if N(r =0 ) |p-ﬁxed > 0.
Since λ
∗

















(r =0 )> 0
Corollary:

























I now establish that raising K lowers period 1 investment using a proof by contradiction.
Consider the behavior of the marginal period 1 investor, with λ0 = λ
∗
0. At the original













2)+K) − (C0 +
1
2





Suppose that increasing K raises I1. T h i sw o u l dr e q u i r et h a ti n v e s t m e n tb e c o m e ss t r i c t l y
preferable for the marginal investor, i.e. dV (i,λ0)/dK > dV (l,λ0)/dK. Recall that
∂Ic
1/∂I1 =1and ∂Ic
2/∂I1 < 1.H e n c e , ∂f/∂Ic
t < 0 implies ∂V (i,λ0)/∂I1 < ∂V (l,λ0)/∂I1.
In addition, observe that ∂V (i,λ0)/∂K<∂V (l,λ0)/∂K because the V (l,λ0) expressions
puts more weight on the ﬁrst term, where K is positive, since β > α when signals are in-
formative. Consequently, both the direct eﬀect of increasing K and the indirect eﬀect of
equilibrium price changes lower V (i,λ0) relative to V (l,λ0) for the marginal investor. This
makes the marginal ﬁrm drop out of the period 1 investment pool, lowering I1.B u t t h i s
contradicts the supposition. Therefore increasing K must strictly lower I1.
Hence, as K →∞ , λ
∗
0 → 1, while implies β(λ
∗




t h a t( 9 )m u s th o l da sK →∞ , as claimed.
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